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Micro Moral Worlds of Contentious Politics: A Reconceptualization of Radical 
Groups and Their Intersections with One Another and the Mainstream 
Abstract 
The emergence, or resurgence, of radical political groups invariably provokes 
a struggle between activists, academics, commentators and policymakers over 
the particular configuration of nouns and adjectives that best correspond to 
the group in question. While such debates are an integral part of political 
practice, scrutiny of the claims made within these debates reveals significant 
limitations in standard strategies of description – most notably their inability 
to satisfactorily render either the essential cultural messiness and dynamism 
of contentious politics or the intersections between the so-called extreme and 
mainstream. We propose an alternative, albeit not mutually exclusive, 
strategy of description. This entails decentering the group per se and focusing 
instead on mapping the micro moral worlds of contentious politics – the 
patchwork of intersubjective contexts of belief and behavior through which 
activism takes place. We illustrate this with two empirical cases: The English 
Defence League in Britain, and Republican Sinn Fein in Ireland. 
Key words: social movements; extremism; radicalism; contentious politics; 
categorization; definition   
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The emergence or resurgence of radical social or political groups invariably provokes 
debate among academics, journalists, politicians and activists about the configuration 
of nouns and adjectives that best correspond to the group. Such debates centre on the 
appropriateness or otherwise of labels for their cause or ideological position – left-
wing, right-wing, Islamist, nationalist, anti-globalization etc – and qualifiers such as 
far, extreme, ultra, alt, radical, neo, new or even “new new” (see Feixa, Pereira and 
Juris 2009). Label preferences are usually justified with reference to definitional 
schemata grounded in the academic literature or statements by state or multilateral 
agencies, themselves subject to considerable debate,1 and with reference to other 
groups considered to exemplify the categories under discussion (Berbrier 2002). 
These claims and counter-claims give rise to a competitive process of “cultural 
cartography” (Gieryn 1999), with contributors to the debate struggling with one 
another over how to locate the group in the existing universe of actors – turning them 
into, or resisting their transformation into, a case of X or a case of Y (Berbrier 2002). 
Such debates serve an important heuristic function for policy-makers, practitioners, 
academics, and other interested actors, enabling them to form swift judgments about 
the nature of the group or individuals they are dealing with – the type of schematic 
simplification that much human decision-making requires (Goffman 1974; Snow and 
Benford 1988; Kahneman 2011). This heuristic function is intertwined with a moral 
function: by situating new groups in relation to existing actors, such debates express 
and shape moral evaluations of the group and its adherents (Berbier 2002). Since 
World War II, for example, labels such as extreme right or far right have acted as a 
cordon sanitaire around actors deemed beyond the political pale, at least in Europe 
and North America (Eatwell 2003; Mouffe 2005). They also perform a strategic-legal 
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or “prognostic” function (Snow and Benford 1988), shaping ideas about what 
comprises legitimate, appropriate and effective responses to that group. 
Yet scrutiny of the claims made in these debates highlights significant limitations to 
such strategies of definition, where the underlying logic is of allocating a group to a 
category based on the extent to which it fits a set of pre-defined characteristics. Five 
issues in particular stand out. First, movements and groups change over time, 
adopting more or less radical ideological positions and action repertoires (della Porta 
1995; Tarrow 1997). How do we ensure that our descriptions are able to 
accommodate such change? At what point does a “mainstream” group become 
“extreme”, and vice-versa? In the case of the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
(PIRA) and Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland, for example, did their move from extreme 
to mainstream take place with their engagement with the peace process, through their 
signing of the Good Friday Agreement or with their acceptance of the Police Service 
of Northern Ireland (PSNI) in 2007? Or should we always consider them extreme? 
Our answers will shape how we view and interact with these groups. 
Second, straightforward categorizations of groups as being more or less radical or 
extreme can overlook important intra-group heterogeneity. Within any group or set of 
groups there are likely to be varied interpretations of their cause and collective 
identity, as well as diverse tactical tastes (Jasper 2007, 229-250; Blee and Creasap 
2010; Blee 2012, 81-108). This can relate to different cliques or subgroups (della 
Porta and Tarrow 1986); to particular moments in the group or movement history 
(Tarrow 1997; Koopmans 2003); or to the different contexts in which activists find 
themselves at any given time. Activists may behave, emote and think quite differently 
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depending on whether they are participating in a street demonstration, a clandestine 
activity, a private meeting, a social media debate and so forth (Simi and Futrell 2010). 
One way scholars have sought to accommodate such heterogeneity has been through 
recourse to Goffman’s (1959) idea of social action comprising a front- and back-
stage, with more public-facing action, such as manifestos, public speeches or media 
appearances, understood as a more coded front-stage, and internal communiques or 
private meetings interpreted as a back-stage, in which activists are less inclined to 
censor their comments or actions (Mudde 2000; Jackson 2011). This has provided a 
useful stimulus for researchers to look beyond the more managed public-facing 
activities of such groups. However, as Fennema and Maussen (2005, 117) observe, it 
runs the risk of infinite evidential regress such that even where “extremist” aspects of 
the group have not been identified, one can always claim they are tucked away in a 
back-stage yet to be “discovered”. Furthermore, fundamental ontological and 
epistemological problems arise if, as is often the case, the back-stage comes to be 
imagined as a truer version of activists’ beliefs, feelings and motives, since even 
during supposed back-stage interactions actors might still be subject to intense social 
pressures. How can we be confident that the more radical statements made by an 
activist during a private meeting comprise the falling away of their front-stage mask 
and not an act of bravado born of a desire for the admiration of their peers? 
Third, it is often difficult to identify where one group ends and another begins – a 
basic requirement if we are to develop arguments of the type “group X should be 
considered part of category C”. This is particularly the case for groups with 
decentralized or network structures – increasingly the norm among social movements 
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(della Porta and Diani 2006, 156-61). Most movements encompass an array of groups 
and sub-groups, the boundaries between which become more or less demarcated over 
time, and who may act more or less independently of one another depending on the 
action undertaken and the relationships between faction and movement leaders (Zald 
and McCarthy 1987). The identification of group or sub-group boundaries is further 
complicated because within movements individuals often claim more than one group 
affiliation (Carrol and Ratner 1996). When Jo Bloggs disrupts a meeting by her local 
parliamentarian, is she acting as part of group A, part of group B or on her own 
initiative? As such, it is easy for actions to be attributed to a whole group or 
movement when they are in fact those of a distinct faction or individual. 
Fourth, labelling debates that centre on establishing a group’s location on a nominal 
mainstream–extreme axis can distort understanding of the relationship of radical 
social and political groups to their wider social, political and historic contexts – a 
salient issue at a time when fringe political groups appear increasingly able to gain 
traction within mainstream political arenas (Bail 2012; Minkenberg 2013). Detailed 
empirical accounts of radical movements indicate that their ideological and cultural 
roots are often more intertwined with those of the cultural mainstream than is 
popularly supposed (Tarrow 1997; Blee and Creasap 2010; Mudde 2010; Pilkington 
2016). Even as groups forge their own micro-cultures, these continue to influence and 
be influenced by other more general cultural currents (Billig 1995; Bail 2012). 
Conventional labelling debates can make it difficult to tease out these intersections 
because they privilege and culturally embed clear categorical distinctions between the 
mainstream and non-mainstream; simultaneously concentrate analytical attention on 
difference between the “extreme” and the “mainstream” while inculcating a scholarly 
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culture of seeking “to ‘prove’ the historical continuity and co-operation” (Mudde 
1996, 230) of movements identified as extreme or radical; and can erect emotional, 
reputational and political barriers to the scholarly consideration of similarity and 
interaction between groups widely considered extreme and mainstream (Blee 2007; 
Pilkington 2016, 13-36).  
Fifth, standard strategies of description tend towards the production of fairly fixed 
and stable categories, yet concepts such as extremism and radicalism are by definition 
relational – “[a]fter all, a non-violent public demonstration or rally can seem 
absolutely banal in Paris, but dangerously revolutionary in Pyongyang” (Gupta 2014, 
140-1). A failure to concentrate sufficient analytical attention on the relational nature 
of radicalism and extremism leaves important questions hanging. How can we talk 
analytically about the radicalization of mainstream politics? How can scholars 
develop meaningful comparisons across national contexts or between different 
periods of history characterized by different broad political cultures? To what extent 
do terms such as extreme or radical have functional equivalence when applied to 
groups drawing on different ideological wells? Is an “extreme right” group’s 
relationship to the non-extreme right and the mainstream the same as an “extreme 
Islamist” group’s relationship to the non-extreme Islamist movement and the 
mainstream; and what about left-wing groups (Busher and Macklin 2015)? 
In this article we propose an alternative strategy of description that, we argue, can 
improve our ability to reflect the cultural complexity and dynamism of radical social 
or political groups, and facilitate analysis of their intersections with other actors, 
including those generally considered part of the mainstream. Our intention is not to 
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argue that the type of classificatory debates with which we are all familiar should not 
take place. They are an integral, even inevitable, part of the political process. Yet we 
would argue that standard strategies of definition are poorly suited either to capturing 
the essential “cultural messiness” (Harris 2009) of contentious politics – a point 
acknowledged by some of the scholars at the forefront of such definitional debates 
(Eatwell 2003; Bruter and Harrison 2011) – or to the description and analysis of the 
intersections between radical social or political groups and the societal mainstream.  
The approach we propose shifts the focus of analysis from the group per se to the 
patchwork of intersubjective contexts of belief and behavior across and through 
which contentious politics happens. We theorize this using the concept of micro 
moral worlds, adapted from Arthur Kleinman’s discussions of “local moral worlds” 
(1992; 2006). We illustrate this with reference to two groups that have prompted 
especially intense labelling debates: the English Defence League (EDL), part of the 
UK’s anti-minority protest scene, and Republican Sinn Fein (RSF), a prominent actor 
in anti-Good Friday Agreement republicanism in Ireland and Northern Ireland. The 
EDL case study is informed by 16 months of ethnographic observation, and more 
than three years of more general observation and analysis of EDL activism (see 
Busher 2015; 2017), as well as other published ethnographies of the group (e.g. 
Pilkington 2016). The RSF case study is informed by the analysis of RSF documents 
and statements, interviews with leadership and rank and file members (Morrison, 
2014), and secondary sources (e.g. Whiting 2012). In what follows, we first introduce 
the case studies. We then discuss the theoretical underpinnings of our proposal and 
develop this with reference to the case studies before setting out what we consider to 
be the advantages of this strategy of description. While our discussion here relates 
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specifically to groups many would categorize as radical or extreme, we believe such a 
strategy of description could also be applied to groups or collective actors typically 
considered mainstream.  
Two illustrative case studies 
When the EDL emerged in 2009, in some ways it looked and felt like what would 
often be described as an extreme or far right group – angry-looking men, many with a 
background in football-related violence, shouting vitriol about Islam, Muslims and 
their prophet; their marches occasional spilling over into violence, including clashes 
with anti-fascists and ethnic-minority youths. Yet most EDL activists claimed to 
eschew racism, defining themselves as a “single-issue group” focused only on 
“Islamic extremism” and the “Islamification” of Britain; the group boasted members 
from ethnic minority groups, and during demonstrations it was common to find 
banners proclaiming “black and white unite against Islamic extremism”, Israel flags 
and expressions of support for homosexuals – not symbols one associates with the 
extreme or far right (Copsey 2010; Busher 2015; Pilkington 2016). Indeed, the EDL 
leadership criticized, and activists occasionally came to blows with, established far 
right groups including the British National Party (BNP) and the National Front (NF). 
The emergence of the EDL gave rise to extensive and still unresolved debates among 
academics, journalists, policymakers and anti-racist/fascist activists about what type 
of phenomenon this was. Some described the EDL as a straightforward continuation 
of the extreme or far right or even fascism (Alessio and Meredith 2014; UAF 2015). 
Others argued that while there were clear ideological and tactical continuities with the 
established far right, there were also important differences (Copsey 2010; Jackson 
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2011; Kassimeris and Jackson 2015), while others still have favored other descriptors, 
such as “anti-Muslim protest” or “anti-Islamic populism” (Pupcenoks and McCabe 
2013; Busher 2015; Pilkington 2016). 
RSF is the oldest of various so-called dissident republican organisations in Ireland 
and Northern Ireland, formed after a 1986 split in Sinn Fein. They present themselves 
as the standard bearers of true Irish republicanism; rejecting the legitimacy of the 
parliaments in Dublin, Belfast and London and any peace agreement that falls short of 
the independent unification of the island of Ireland. Their formation coincided with a 
paramilitary split in the PIRA, leading to the formation of the Continuity IRA 
(CIRA). The relationship between RSF and CIRA is however difficult to unpick. It is 
publicly known, and privately acknowledged, that RSF is the political wing of the 
CIRA (Morrison 2014, 144), with the two organisations sometimes collectively 
referred to as the Continuity Republican Movement. Yet they never publicly 
acknowledge their connection and, in spite of considerable crossover membership, 
there is not generalized mutual support or sympathy between members of the two 
organisations (Morrison 2014, 145). In 2009 there was a resurgence of violence 
carried out by anti-Good Friday Agreement republicans. This included killing police 
officers and British soldiers, attacks against civilian and economic targets and violent 
vigilantism within the communities they claim to represent (Morrison and Horgan 
2016). RSF’s relationship to this violence remains subject to debate. 
Within the public and media discourse, RSF and the other anti-Good Friday 
Agreement republican groups are often referred to as “dissident” republicans because 
their activism stems from their dissent to the politicization of republicanism through 
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Sinn Fein and the PIRA. Yet this terminology is contested. For some, “dissident” 
bestows an unjustified air of nobility on groups associated more or less directly with 
paramilitary activities, and for a time the British and Irish governments, and the 
PSNI, preferred the phrase “residual terrorist groups” (Horgan and Morrison 2011). 
Their former comrades in Sinn Fein refused to acknowledge these groups as 
republican, let alone dissident, preferring the term “micro-groups” (see Whelan 
2008). Meanwhile, for some unionists, the dissident label serves to falsely 
differentiate modern-day violence from that of the Provisionals (Derry Journal 2014). 
Academia is similarly divided. Some argue in favor of “dissident”, albeit they 
distinguish between violent and non-violent dissident republicanism (Horgan and 
Morrison 2011). Some however espouse alternative labels such as “republican ultras” 
(Tonge 2004), while others argue that the “dissident” qualifier is too ambiguous and 
fails to reflect the heterogeneity of actors, their actions and beliefs (Whiting 2015). 
Societies as networks of local moral worlds 
As described above, our proposal is conceptually rooted in Kleinman’s discussion of 
“local moral worlds”, a term he uses to refer to the “particular” and “intersubjective” 
“contexts of belief and behavior” that are “constitutive of the lived flow of 
experience” (Kleinman 1992, 172). They are the spaces of social interaction through 
which we live our lives and through which we develop our ideas, attitudes and 
feelings about ourselves and the world around us.2 They are local in that they are 
particular to a set of individuals engaged in a specific series of social interactions. 
These might take place across a range of spatial or temporal scales: a particular 
workplace or family (Kleinman 1992), a specific village or site of public service 
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delivery (Meinert 2000; Abramowitz 2005; Schuster 2005), or transnational networks 
of actors mobilizing around common issues through shared modalities (Busher 2010). 
What defines these as local is that they emerge through a series of interactions, 
focused around a specific place or type of place, institution or set of institutions. 
Local moral worlds are moral in the sense that human life is “inevitably moral” 
because it entails the ongoing formation, assertion and negotiation of judgments 
about what is right or wrong, or has more or less value (Kleinman 2006, 1; Smith 
2003). These judgments are expressed and forged through action and interaction – 
whose hands we shake, who we doff our (metaphorical) caps to, when we applaud 
and when we remain silent, whether we encourage our children to study pharmacy or 
parapsychology, or when we allow ourselves to grin from ear to ear or suppress a 
smile – thereby generating emergent situated norms concerning what we should think 
and say, do and feel (Geertz 1973; Fine 2010; Hochschild 1979; Mische and White 
1998). Breeches of these emergent normative orders are likely to attract social 
sanction, while behavior that resonates with these emergent normative orders is likely 
to attract social rewards (Mead 1934; Goffman 1967; Fine 2010). 
From this perspective, societies constitute “a network of local worlds” (Fine 2010, 
371), each with their own subtly different emergent normative orders, i.e. with their 
own “terms for propriety” (Fine 2010, 366), “ground rules for interaction” (Eliasoph 
1999), “feeling rules” (Hochschild 1979) and interpretive schemata (Goffman 1974). 
Meanwhile, most individuals can be conceived of as moving across multiple local 
moral worlds in the course of their everyday lives – that of the home, the workplace, 
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the place of worship, their local sports club etc – and in doing so, reproducing, 
negotiating and sometimes transforming these local moral worlds.  
Radical movements as networks of micro moral worlds 
In the same way that societies can be conceived of as a network of local worlds, we 
conceive of collective actors engaged in contentious politics as constituting a network 
of micro moral worlds.3 Most social movements and groups undertake a range of 
activities (della Porta and Diani 2006, 168-70; Tilly 2008). While the social spaces 
associated with these activities have elements in common – cross-cutting identity-
structures, ideological precepts, emotional rhythms and inter-personal ties around 
which the group coheres (Klandermans 1992; Melucci 1995; Hunt and Benford 2004; 
Jasper 2011; Summers Effler 2010) – there are also usually important differences 
(Simi and Futrell 2010). What activists (expect to) think and feel and what they 
consider legitimate, praiseworthy or improper is likely to vary between, for example, 
a protest march, a fundraising event and a public debate featuring their leaders. This 
is because the different actions and interactions that take place in these spaces – both 
between activists and between activists, counter-movement groups, journalists or the 
police (Oliver and Myers 2002)  – spin out more or less subtly different terms for 
propriety, ground rules for interaction, feeling rules and so forth.4 The strategy of 
description that we propose is based on tracing, and comparing the contours of, the 
emergent normative orders to be found within this patchwork of micro moral worlds. 
Primary micro moral worlds  
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We begin with what we call the primary micro moral worlds: the contexts of belief 
and behavior directly associated with the group e.g. marches that the group organizes, 
an online forum they manage and so forth. As we now illustrate, even with a fairly 
cursory account of these contexts of belief and behavior, we can begin to surface 
important differences in the emergent normative orders of these spaces. 
In the case of the EDL (Figure 1),5, 6 some of the most prominent differences relate to 
the use or acceptance of violence and overtly racist language across these spaces. 
Figure 1. Illustrative diagram of the primary micro moral worlds of EDL activism 
National demonstrations: These are formal events that attract participants from across 
the country, including supporters from various cognate groups, and are undertaken in 
liaison with public authorities. At the EDL’s peak, they attracted in excess of 2,000 
participants, but at other times drew smaller crowds (circa 200-300). They tend to be 
heavily policed and attract substantial counter-demonstrations. Most are characterized 
by small- or medium-scale public disorder, and most activists acknowledge that the 
prospect of it “kicking-off” was at least initially an important draw for many who 
became activists (Pilkington 2016, 182-6). However, event organizers, stewards and 
many senior activists usually encourage participants to comply with police 
instructions and avoid confrontations, meaning that there are relatively few 
opportunities for legitimate or status-raising violence during these events. Most 
violence occurs either when activists come face-to-face with counter-protestors – 
when they are able to claim that their violence was provoked, or at the end of the 
demonstration when activists disperse and are therefore less easily managed and 
many are intoxicated (Busher 2013). Violence is usually limited to throwing 
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projectiles at and occasional fist-fights with opposing activists. Use of weapons is 
very rare. Similarly, while overtly racist chanting is not uncommon, stewards usually 
seek to curtail such behavior, and the performance of taboo gestures, such as a 
straight-arm Nazi salute, can result in those performing the gesture being ostracized 
or even assaulted by co-activists (Busher 2015, 113; In Press; Pilkington 2016, 98). 
Local/regional demonstrations: These are also formal demonstrations undertaken in 
liaison with public authorities, but are organized by local groups and tend only to 
attract participants from the surrounding region. The smaller scale of these 
demonstrations means they are usually less heavily policed, attract smaller counter-
demonstrations and have fewer public disorder incidents, although this may vary 
across the country. As such, the emotional mood is usually more relaxed than national 
demonstrations with fewer opportunities for what activists deem legitimate violence. 
These events are often described by organizers and participants as “family events”, 
with violence or racist chanting heavily sanctioned by co-activists (Busher 2013). 
Flash demonstrations: These usually comprise no more than about 15 activists and 
are undertaken without liaison with public authorities, meaning there is more direct 
contact with the public and/or opponents. These events explicitly challenge and 
circumvent state authority. Occasionally, but not always, this has included the 
deployment of more serious violence, e.g. grievous bodily harm, than that generally 
seen on official demonstrations (Busher 2015, 134; Pilkington 2016, 15), without 
those involved in the violence facing significant sanction from their co-activists. 
Disruptive actions: Some EDL activists periodically undertake actions intended to 
disrupt events held by extreme Islamist or left-wing groups. These are usually 
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organized offline via mobile phone, and involve a closed circle of trusted contacts in 
order to minimize the likelihood of police detection. These actions are intentionally 
provocative. Physical violence, directed at their opponents or the building in which 
they are meeting, is commonplace and considered justified (e.g. Busher 2015, 18).  
Memorial events: These are organized around symbolically important dates, such as 
Remembrance Day or the anniversaries of the attacks of 11 September 2001 (New 
York and the Pentagon) and 7 July 2005 (London). In place of boozy chanting and 
songs typical of demonstrations, they are characterized by performances of solemnity, 
such as wreath laying and silences. Most activists adopt a different aesthetic than they 
do for a demonstration: smarter shoes and sometimes a shirt, even a tie. Unprovoked 
disorder is very rare and attracts strong sanctions from co-activists. However, 
incidents of what activists consider heavy-handed policing or provocation by 
opposition groups can generate particularly intense moral indignation, which may be 
used to legitimize violence and non-cooperation with the police (Busher 2015, 74-
96). Such memorials often involve participants from other so-called patriotic groups.  
Charity fundraisers: Activists have raised funds for a number of charitable causes, 
often associated with military veterans. This has included charity walks, public 
collections, small fairs and sleep-outs. Such events imitate closely charity events 
organized around the country most weekends for any number of causes, such as 
animal welfare or a local cancer hospice. An English flag or two might be flown and 
some activists might wear clothing carrying (usually discreet) movement insignia, but 
chanting is largely avoided and a relatively high proportion of attendees are children. 
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Physical violence is very rare. These events are often attended by people outside or 
peripheral to the group, including activists’ family and friends. 
Street outreach (distribution of flyers and petitions): Activists usually wear clothes 
bearing group insignia, unless deemed unsafe to do so e.g. in an area with a large 
Muslim population. Activists by and large show courtesy and openness towards the 
public: speaking clearly, putting forward their arguments using statistics, personal 
stories and recommending websites. They avoid chanting and build rapport through 
small acts of respectability, such as helping elderly people or people with limited 
mobility across roads. Overt racist language is usually strictly avoided. 
Local membership meetings: These usually take place in a pub or a member’s house. 
Meetings are informal, without minute-taking or formal motions, but provide a space 
for activists to share information and discuss new initiatives (Pilkington 2016, 43). 
Deference is afforded to more established activists, but everybody is given an 
opportunity to have their say. Here, there are often discussions about how to reduce 
drunkenness and disorder on demonstrations. While overtly racist speech is more 
common here than in public-facing contexts, it may still be sanctioned through direct 
criticism or, more subtly, through scant positive emotional feedback from other 
activists (Busher 2017). While not necessarily a popular position, within such spaces 
some activists have advocated forging alliances with established extreme right groups 
or with individuals (previously) associated with such groups. 
Official online communications (official website, Twitter feeds and Facebook pages): 
The EDL has made effective use of the Internet, especially social media, to build 
support (Jackson 2011). While the material uploaded and distributed via these 
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platforms is often provocative, by and large it focuses on the EDL’s core concerns 
about the supposed Islamification of Britain. References to established extreme right 
groups or white power literature are exceptionally rare, and some national and local 
organizers spend considerable time moderating Facebook pages, removing posts that 
express support for extreme right groups or contain explicitly racist content (Busher 
2017). Most of the internet links shared by activists are taken from mainstream news 
media or from avowedly not-far-right websites, usually associated with the so-called 
counter-jihad movement (Busher 2015, 110-5). 
Unofficial online communications (personal social media accounts): Here, local 
organizers are not able to remove posts, and activists are more likely to share material 
that strays from the main focal points of their protest narrative. Some activists post 
material that is overtly racist, e.g. in support of white supremacist groups in South 
Africa or the USA, although this sometimes results in challenge, hostility or even un-
friending by co-activists. As such, behavioral norms here are considerably less 
consistent than in official online spaces, and sanctions less systematic. 
In the case of RSF (Figure 2), some of the most prominent differences across their 
primary micro moral worlds relate to how the relationship with paramilitary and non-
dissident groups is constructed.  
Figure 2: Illustrative diagram of the primary micro moral worlds of RSF activism 
Cumann: The cumann is the local branch of Irish political parties, where members 
debate local, national and international issues relating to the party and the wider 
movement, decide how they as a cumann will vote in national votes and organize 
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local membership and activities. Each cumann selects two delegates to represent its 
membership at the Ard Fheis (see below), and to vote on their behalf.7 The cumainn 
(plural of cumann) play a significant role, with local positions on policy issues 
sometimes at odds with the national organizational positioning (Morrison 2016). As 
such, articulation of support for, or their relationship with, paramilitary groups can 
vary considerably across cumainn. In a recent 2010 split in the Continuity Republican 
Movement almost an entire cumann in Limerick led the fragmentation of the 
organization; largely a result of a locally held belief that the Continuity IRA should 
be more open to working with other violent dissident organisations. 
Ard Fheis and Ard Comhairle: In contrast to the localized cumainn, the national voice 
of the movement comes from the organization’s Ard Fheis (annual party conference) 
and Ard Comhairle (national executive). Within the Ard Fheis their political platform 
is debated among representatives from each of the cumainn, with constitutional and 
non-constitutional decisions made through accumulated votes. It is also where the 
leadership of the party is elected. Here members regularly acknowledge their support 
for, but not connection to, the on-going “armed struggle.” Any references to direct 
paramilitary connections are however minimized or quickly closed down by leaders 
and moderators, emphasizing norms about the official national position regarding 
paramilitary activity. In addition, close observation of constitutional rules and 
processes, even at times of intra-organizational conflict (Morrison 2014), reinforces 
members’ beliefs that they constitute a legitimate and organized political party. 
Saoirse (newspaper): The primary source of news for RSF members and supporters 
continues to be their monthly paper, Saoirse (Freedom). It is vital to RSF recruitment 
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and positioning, with the paper often contrasting the continuity of RSF political and 
moral positions over time with that of their republican revivals in order to legitimize 
claims to be the standard bearers of Irish republicanism. Saoirse functions however as 
a movement-wide paper, also hosting news about and statements from the CIRA, 
Cumann na mBan,8 CIRA prisoners and others, enabling these actors to put forward 
their views and claims of responsibility for attacks. By publishing CIRA statements it 
suggests that the justification for violence and revolution still remains (Whiting, 
2012), and conveys belief in the legitimacy of all facets of the movement. 
Commemorations: The Continuity Republican Movement see themselves as the true 
heirs of the historical Irish republican traditions of Wolfe Tone, Padraig Pearse and 
others. This identity claim is enacted through year-round commemorations at graves 
and memorials across Ireland, including commemorations to mark the 1916 Easter 
Rising, the birth of Wolfe Tone and the 1981 H-Block hunger strikes (White and 
Fraser, 2000). Some participants with a paramilitary connection attend in military 
uniform to provide a show of strength, sometimes accentuated by an armed salute and 
a paramilitary parade. Paramilitary exhibitions are generally afforded respect by the 
non-paramilitary participants, and those not seen to be doing so may be physically or 
verbally reprimanded by senior members present. Such performances clearly assert 
the continued legitimacy of paramilitary activity and instill belief in activists’ claims 
to represent a disciplined and able alternative to Sinn Fein. 
United Ireland protests: These are public protests organized by RSF and focused 
primarily on their call for the end of “British occupation of the six counties of the 
North of Ireland.” These are often held at events and meetings where British ministers 
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or royals are in attendance. Adopting a strategy of action familiar to many civilian 
protest groups, participants set out their position through banners, songs and 
speeches, declaring in their case the necessity of Irish unity as well as denouncing 
British politicians, the PSNI, the British royal family and members of Sinn Fein. 
Participants wear civilian rather than paramilitary clothing, thereby further distancing 
themselves from overt associations with paramilitarism. By enabling participants to 
remain morally distant from paramilitary violence, these events attract supporters and 
sympathizers who tend to avoid events characterized by paramilitary rituals. 
Anti-austerity protests: While the majority of analyses of Irish republican activity 
focus on their desire for a united Ireland, the organisations aim more specifically to 
achieve an independent and united socialist Ireland (Morrison, 2016). This has led to 
RSF and their affiliated groups recently engaging in anti-austerity protests, in 
particular protests against water charges across the Republic of Ireland (Republican 
Sinn Fein 2016), often in coordination with other non-republican, civil action groups 
and parties. During such events RSF activists make no outward displays of traditional 
republicanism apart from organisational symbols on banners and posters, and no 
overt connection is made to paramilitarism (Brady, O’Connor and Sheahan 2014). 
Rather, their chants and banners emphasize discontent about the political and business 
elites, thereby contributing to the production of a context of belief and behavior 
consistent with the wider national, and global, anti-austerity movement. 
Prisoner support campaigns: The release and a strengthening of the rights of 
republican prisoners has been a central campaign issue for RSF. Regular protests are 
organized by POW Department and other affiliated prisoner support groups, often 
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outside prisons and usually attended by RSF members and the families of prisoners. 
These protests encapsulate the ambivalent relationship between RSF and 
paramilitarism. On the one hand prisoners are not always identified explicitly as 
CIRA prisoners but rather, grounding their claims in human rights discourse, are 
framed as individual victims of an oppressive state, denied the right to fair trial or 
political prisoner status and subject to abuse by prison staff. On the other hand, 
repeated links are made between the current prisoner issue and prisoner protests and 
hunger-strikes of the early 1980s and, with that, to earlier periods of conflict 
characterized by extensive paramilitary activity. No paramilitary attire is worn or 
overt paramilitary symbols displayed during these protests. Alongside these protests 
Cabhair, the Irish Republican Prisoners Dependents’ Fund, collects money to support 
current and former prisoners and their families, playing an unofficial welfare role. 
Cabhair raises funds and awareness through a variety of activities including postal 
donations, Christmas swims, bucket collections and annual testimonial dinners. Such 
activities bear a striking resemblance to the fundraising activities of all sorts of 
charitable organizations across Ireland and attract participants who tend to avoid 
events characterized by paramilitary rituals or the use of paramilitary symbols.       
Official online communications (RSF website and cumainn Facebook pages). Items 
and comments in these spaces generally toe the official movement line i.e. while 
support in principle for the armed struggle may be expressed, connections to 
paramilitary activity are in most cases denied. However, on the Facebook pages in 
particular, the parameters of acceptability vary across cumainn, partly as a function of 
the extent to which local organizers moderate the pages and the political-normative 
positioning of those individuals and their cumann.  
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Unofficial online communications: Individual members also communicate using 
republican-specific discussion forums and through personal social media pages to 
promote their political beliefs, justify violence, and partake in organizational critiques 
when campaigns go wrong (Bowman-Grieve and Conway, 2012). Here, members are 
more likely to deviate from the party line than they are in the official online spaces. 
For example, it is more common here to find claims about participation in 
paramilitary activities. However, the justification of violence and attachment of blame 
for attacks are usually carried out using a pseudonym. 
Our argument is that by describing the micro moral worlds in and through which 
these groups operate we can surface subtle yet potentially significant differences in 
the terms for propriety, ground rules for interaction, feeling rules, self-image and so 
forth that constitute the lived experiences of activists in these groups. In doing so we 
start to develop a rich and highly granular picture of the emergent movement culture. 
As discussed in the introduction however it is rare for activists in any group not to 
engage with the activists and activities of other groups with overlapping interests or 
concerns. As such, it is also necessary to look beyond their primary micro moral 
worlds to what we call their adjacent micro moral worlds: the contexts of belief and 
behavior not associated directly with the group, but where at least some activists from 
the group either participate (e.g. events held by cognate groups), or to which they 
make frequent reference when developing arguments about their cause (e.g. 
publications, websites or online forums).  
Adjacent micro moral worlds and incursions into other arenas 
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In the case of the EDL (Figure 3), such adjacent micro moral worlds would comprise 
the esoteric contexts of belief and behavior associated with the wider protest scenes 
with which EDL activists have engaged. These include the online and offline spaces 
of groups that have marched alongside but sought to differentiate themselves from the 
EDL, such as March for England (MfE), the North-West Infidels (NWI) or Pegida 
UK; web forums and other online spaces associated with the so-called counter-jihad 
movement, such as Gates of Vienna and Four Freedoms (Mulhall and Lowles 2015), 
where EDL activists often participate in debates; and the online and offline spaces of 
established extreme right groups, such as the BNP or NF – groups with which a 
significant minority of EDL activists have previous or ongoing ties.  
The EDL’s adjacent micro moral worlds would, however, also comprise less esoteric 
contexts of belief and behavior, including some of the online and offline spaces 
associated with the UK Independence Party (UKIP) – a Eurosceptic party usually 
described as part of the radical rather than far right. UKIP does not accept 
membership applications from current or former EDL members but, nevertheless, is 
popular among EDL activists (e.g. Archibald 2016). Other adjacent micro moral 
worlds would include Breitbart news – a news and opinion website popular among 
EDL activists, whose former executive chair, Stephen Bannon, was for a period 
Senior Counselor to President Trump; national charitable campaigns in support of 
military veterans – campaigns supported by EDL activists, albeit they often do not 
disclose their EDL affiliation for fear of undermining the public legitimacy of these 
campaigns; the comments sections of mainstream online news articles on issues of 
interest to EDL activists, where some are prolific contributors, and anti-EU protests. 
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Figure 3: Illustrative diagram of the primary micro worlds of EDL activism and 
adjacent micro moral worlds (shaded) 
In the case of RSF (Figure 4), adjacent micro moral worlds would include some of 
the contexts of belief and behavior associated with the paramilitary activity and 
organized criminality (primarily extortion) of the CIRA (See Hourigan, Morrison, 
Windle, and Silke 2017); the youth and female wings, Na Fianna Eireann and 
Cumann na mBan; as well as contexts of belief and behavior associated with other 
paramilitary organisations, such as the New IRA, Oglaigh na hEireann (ONH) and the 
Real Continuity IRA. While RSF has organizationally refused to work with some of 
these groups, individual members have been known to crossover, or at least 
sympathize with their activities and positions (Morrison 2011). RSF’s adjacent micro 
moral worlds would also include offline and online spaces associated with other 
organisations within political dissident republicanism, such as Eirigi, the 32 County 
Sovereignty Movement, the Irish Republican Socialist Party, Republican Network for 
Unity, and the 1916 Societies – groups that oppose the current peace process and Sinn 
Fein’s engagement with the political establishment in Northern Ireland, but who 
publicly disassociate with paramilitary actions. In addition, RSF’s adjacent micro 
moral worlds would currently include online and offline spaces associated with the 
wider anti-austerity movement, as well as transnational anti-imperialist forums that 
RSF members share with groups such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization. 
Figure 4: Illustrative diagram of primary micro moral worlds of RSF Activism and 
adjacent micro moral worlds (shaded) 
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Once adjacent micro moral worlds have been identified, we propose two analytical 
tasks (although we do not undertake these here due to space limitations): a) 
description of the emergent normative orders of these contexts of belief and behavior 
including, where possible, the role of activists from the group under analysis within 
these spaces (e.g. do they contribute overtly or covertly, are they largely criticized or 
praised, do they tend to abide by or challenge the local normative orders, are they 
prominent or background actors, etc.); and b) comparison between the adjacent and 
primary micro moral worlds. 
Analysis of the adjacent micro moral worlds has two primary purposes. First, it 
ensures a fuller and more contextualized description of the contexts of belief and 
behavior in and through which the group operates. While it is important to recognize 
that other actors in these spaces might not sympathize or want to be associated with 
the group under analysis, such spaces are analytically relevant because they comprise 
possible “inter-locks” (Fine 2010) between these groups and other publics. 
Second, it enables systematic analysis of cultural convergence and divergence 
between the group under analysis and other groups with overlapping interests. How 
similar or distinct are the EDL’s official online spaces when compared with those of 
UKIP and Breitbart news, and how does this change over time? To what extent do the 
emergent normative orders of street protests organized by the EDL, MfE or NWI 
differ from one another and over time, and what does this tell us about the evolution 
of the UK’s anti-minority protest scene? Where and when do we find overlap 
between the primary micro moral worlds of RSF and those of dissident republican 
groups engaged overtly in paramilitary activity? How, if at all, are patterns of cultural 
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convergence or divergence shaped by policy announcements made by Sinn Fein or 
the Irish government? How similar are the emergent normative orders of prisoner 
support protests held by different “dissident” groups – are they moments of 
movement-wide harmony or discord? 
Finally, we must also capture instances in which actors from groups such as the EDL 
or RSF undertake incursions into other arenas: such as appearances, invited or 
otherwise, on mainstream news programmes or contributions to public debates that 
fall outside the primary or adjacent micro moral worlds. In the case of the EDL, this 
would include television appearances by EDL leaders in documentaries or 
programmes by national broadcast media, or when activists have called radio phone-
in shows to set out their positions. In the case of RSF, this would again include calls 
to radio phone-in shows or incidents where members have managed, usually briefly, 
to state their positions from the audience of current affairs television shows. Here, the 
emergent normative orders are largely shaped by actors external, and often hostile, to 
the group. Of relevance to our analysis therefore would be: a) the extent to which they 
comply with these emergent normative orders (e.g. do they abide by the rules of 
discussion set out by event moderators and enacted by other event participants?), and 
b) variation between how they position and present themselves in these spaces and 
the emergent normative orders characteristic of their primary micro moral worlds.   
Discussion: The implications of a micro moral worlds approach 
Describing groups such as the EDL or RSF as a patchwork of micro moral worlds 
does not preclude arriving eventually at claims of the type “group X fits best in 
category C”. It does mean however that before such claims can be made it is 
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necessary to make other claims. These will be of the type “group X is directly 
associated with contexts characterized by behaviors P, Q and R and is less directly 
associated with contexts characterized by behaviors P, S and T”, from which we 
might make inferences about the interpretive frames, emotion rules and normative 
orders characteristic of these contexts.9 This can form the basis of comparison both 
between the contexts associated, more or less directly, with group X and between 
those associated with groups Y and Z, where groups Y and Z might be broadly cognate 
groups but might also be opposition groups or groups popularly considered 
mainstream, depending on the purpose of the analysis. Only then might such claims 
be used to develop more basic categorical claims about the group. 
We propose three ways in which the shift in descriptive focus from the group per se 
to description of the patchwork of intersubjective contexts of belief and behavior 
through which contentious politics takes place can better render the cultural 
messiness of radical social movements and help to generate a more detailed 
understanding of their cultural intersections with other groups. First, it compels us to 
document and theorize the complexity and apparent contradictions within movement 
cultures, and in the behavior of individuals as they move across these spaces, rather 
than smoothing out cultural heterogeneity and apparent contradiction. This has 
benefits above and beyond providing a richer account of the movement culture. For 
example, it can help scholars interested in intra-group or intra-movement conflict and 
the sustainability of alliances locate and interrogate potential “cultural openings” 
(Babb 1997) and dissonance likely to shape patterns of support and coalition viability. 
It also enables description of points of convergence or divergence in the frames and 
practices of different groups without implying overall cultural convergence or 
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divergence between them, thereby helping to capture and convey the often ambivalent 
relations between cognate groups. 
Second, the micro moral worlds approach is better able than standard strategies of 
definition to accommodate the fuzziness of group or movement boundaries because it 
is underpinned by an acknowledgement that nominal groups operate across and 
through a range of contexts, over which they exert varying degrees of control. Rather 
than providing a picture of the movement landscape as characterized by abrupt group 
boundaries or coalitions, it enables us to conceive of and describe points of overlap 
and interstitial spaces where actors from two or more groups contribute to the 
production of the micro moral world without having to suppose any formal or quasi-
formal collaboration between them. This is likely to be particularly pertinent when 
exploring the situated cultural confluences of radical and mainstream actors.10  
Third, the description of micro moral worlds provides a robust basis for systematic 
comparison across groups and over time. This is because: a) it requires a description 
of as full a range of micro moral worlds as possible; and b) it requires an explicitly 
situated description of activists’ practices i.e. within the context of belief and 
behavior in which they take place. This reduces the likelihood that activists’ practices 
in one context can be cherry-picked to support a particular interpretation of the group 
in general. Furthermore, the requirement to compare across the primary and adjacent 
micro moral worlds of the group in question and, ideally of cognate or comparator 
groups, ensures that the inherently relational nature of terms such as extreme, far and 
radical sits at the heart of the analytical process. 
Conclusion 
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Standard labelling debates are an integral part of political contention (Benford and 
Snow 2000), and are deeply embedded within media, political and academic cultures. 
Yet critical analysis of these debates reveals significant conceptual, ontological and 
epistemological limitations in the strategies of description that underpin them. We 
have proposed an alternative strategy for describing contentious politics and the 
actors engaged in it. This comprises, a) conceiving of groups or movements as 
constituting a patchwork of primary micro moral worlds, b) situating these within a 
wider tapestry of adjacent micro moral worlds, c) describing the contours of these 
micro moral worlds through observation of how participants in these spaces negotiate 
their emergent normative orders, and d) comparing across the primary and adjacent 
micro moral worlds associated with the group in question and with other cognate or 
comparator groups in order to describe intra- and inter-group cultural convergence 
and divergence. This strategy does not, and is not intended to, resolve the problem of 
how to label such groups. It does however enable us to better capture the essential 
cultural messiness of these collective actors and develop more systematic analyses of 
how and where they may culturally converge with or diverge from one another and 
groups usually considered part of the political mainstream.  
As well as providing a more granular description of such groups and their points of 
cultural convergence and divergence with other groups or scenes, we believe that this 
strategy of description can also opening up new lines of enquiry for scholars 
concerned with understanding and explaining the practices, patterns and lived 
experience of contentious politics, particularly if synergies with analytical strategies 
such as life history analysis (Klandermans and Mayer 2006) and social network 
analysis are effectively exploited.11 These include, but are not limited to: a) 
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examining the extent to which individual activists’ cognitive evaluations and 
emotional responses to relevant stimuli do vary across micro moral worlds, and the 
extent to which such fluctuations are transitory or contribute to sustained changes in 
an individual’s cognitive and affective practices; b) drawing on existing social 
movement theories to develop a detailed explanation as to the patterns of variation 
across primary and adjacent micro moral worlds that are surfaced through the 
description of these contexts of belief and behavior; c) examining how, under what 
conditions and through what mechanisms tactical or ideological radicalisation within 
one primary micro moral world affects the emergent normative orders of other micro 
moral worlds associated with the same group and/or their allies and/or opponents; d) 
how the range of micro moral worlds associated with a group assists or hinders their 
accommodation of a heterogeneous membership and shapes recruitment and 
desistance pathways; e) whether patterns of cultural convergence/divergence and 
participation across primary and adjacent micro moral worlds can be used to analyse 
or even predict emergent splits and alliances; and f) longitudinal analysis of cultural 
convergence and divergence between micro moral worlds associated with radical 
fringe groups and those associated with institutionalized or mainstream actors. 
We conclude by pre-empting two possible criticisms. The first is that the application 
of this approach would be data heavy and resource intensive and, in the case of 
radical groups, that access to some of their micro moral worlds would be limited. 
While this undoubtedly presents a challenge, it is not unique to this approach. 
Furthermore, use of social media analysis and the proliferation of video footage 
available online is making it increasingly quick, easy, and relatively inexpensive to 
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access many of the contexts of belief and behavior associated with these movements 
(see Collins 2008; Fisher 2015; Innes, Roberts, Preece and Rogers 2016).   
A second possible criticism of such a micro-oriented approach might be that it risks 
“missing the wood for the trees” (see for example Weinberg 1998). We believe that 
this would miss the point that is being made. One of the characteristics of recent 
research on collective action and contentious politics has been a turning away from 
grand theory towards approaches that seek to get closer to human experience and 
ground analysis in an explicit theorization of human action and interaction 
(Harrington and Fine 2006; Jasper 2010). This is not about turning away from big 
social or analytical issues but recognizing that the explanatory power of the theories 
we use will always remain limited unless we embrace and interrogate rather than 
smoothing out the complexity of human action and the contexts in which it unfolds.  
Exploring radical movements as a patchwork of micro moral worlds can provide us a 
picture with considerably more depth and at higher resolution than that with which 
academics, policymakers and practitioners by and large operate today. It also has the 
potential to create opportunities for important critical reflection on ontological 
categories that currently dominate, and we would argue sometimes stymie, much of 
our thinking in this area. 
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